Hybrid Utilitarianism - An Ethical System
For those who are unfamiliar with it, Act Utilitarianism is a system in which an action is deemed ethically good to the degree that it maximises the welfare of conscious beings. This welfare is defined as happiness or pleasure (minus unhappiness or pain) in Hedonistic Utilitarianism and defined as preference satisfaction in Preference Utilitarianism. I adhere to a hybrid of these two versions of Act Utilitarianism. My “Hybrid Utilitarianism” as i call it, is original to me as far as i know.
As with all forms of Act Utilitarianism, my system asks us to maximise the welfare of those living now and those not yet born. The difference between Hybrid Utilitarianism and previous forms of the doctrine is that in my system the welfare of those currently living is defined in preference terms while the welfare of those not yet born is defined in hedonistic terms. So to see how ethically good an act is under Hybrid Utilitarianism we take the amount of pleasure (minus pain) the act causes to those not yet born and add that to the amount of preference satisfaction it gains to those already alive.
My system is not quite this simple, however, as i would include a few caveats. Firstly, in the hedonistic part of the scheme i would only count pleasures to the extent that they are novel. So if, say, an animal (human or otherwise) will be born, who is likely to have a pleasant life but one very similar to that of a previous individual of that species, its pleasures would count for much less than if they were novel. Pain counts negatively to the same degree, however, whether it is novel or not.
Secondly, if an action will lead the world to two possible futures, one extremely pleasant for everyone but extremely unlikely, the other slightly unpleasant for everyone and almost certain to happen, then the value of this action will not simply be worked out as the amounts of pleasure for each of these outcomes multiplied by their probabilities and added together. The value of the unlikely event will, instead, be weighted down further, as it is such a longshot. Also if the unlikely outcome leads, somehow, to an infinite increase in pleasure, then it should only be valued as finite.
Lastly, in the case of some animals (human or otherwise) who are alive now, i would define their welfare as pleasure minus pain rather than preference satisfaction. Here i am thinking of the insane and those whose preferences have been manipulated by others, perhaps through genetic engineering.
For those who are unfamiliar with it, Act Utilitarianism is a system in which an action is deemed ethically good to the degree that it maximises the welfare of conscious beings. This welfare is defined as happiness or pleasure (minus unhappiness or pain) in Hedonistic Utilitarianism and defined as preference satisfaction in Preference Utilitarianism. I adhere to a hybrid of these two versions of Act Utilitarianism. My “Hybrid Utilitarianism” as i call it, is original to me as far as i know.
As with all forms of Act Utilitarianism, my system asks us to maximise the welfare of those living now and those not yet born. The difference between Hybrid Utilitarianism and previous forms of the doctrine is that in my system the welfare of those currently living is defined in preference terms while the welfare of those not yet born is defined in hedonistic terms. So to see how ethically good an act is under Hybrid Utilitarianism we take the amount of pleasure (minus pain) the act causes to those not yet born and add that to the amount of preference satisfaction it gains to those already alive.
My system is not quite this simple, however, as i would include a few caveats. Firstly, in the hedonistic part of the scheme i would only count pleasures to the extent that they are novel. So if, say, an animal (human or otherwise) will be born, who is likely to have a pleasant life but one very similar to that of a previous individual of that species, its pleasures would count for much less than if they were novel. Pain counts negatively to the same degree, however, whether it is novel or not.
Secondly, if an action will lead the world to two possible futures, one extremely pleasant for everyone but extremely unlikely, the other slightly unpleasant for everyone and almost certain to happen, then the value of this action will not simply be worked out as the amounts of pleasure for each of these outcomes multiplied by their probabilities and added together. The value of the unlikely event will, instead, be weighted down further, as it is such a longshot. Also if the unlikely outcome leads, somehow, to an infinite increase in pleasure, then it should only be valued as finite.
Lastly, in the case of some animals (human or otherwise) who are alive now, i would define their welfare as pleasure minus pain rather than preference satisfaction. Here i am thinking of the insane and those whose preferences have been manipulated by others, perhaps through genetic engineering.